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Abstract
Boundary extension is a common false memory error, in which people confidently remember
seeing a wider angle view of the scene than was viewed. Previous research found that boundary
extension is scene-specific and did not examine this phenomenon in nonscenes. The present
research explored boundary extension in cropped face images. Participants completed either a
short-term or a long-term condition of the task. During the encoding, they observed photographs
of faces, cropped either in a forehead or in a chin area, and subsequently performed face
recognition through a forced-choice selection. The recognition options represented different
degrees of boundary extension and boundary restriction errors. Eye-tracking and performance
data were collected. The results demonstrated boundary extension in both memory conditions.
Furthermore, previous literature reported the asymmetry in amounts of expansion at different
sides of an image. The present work provides the evidence of asymmetry in boundary extension.
In the short-term condition, boundary extension errors were more pronounced for forehead,
than for chin face areas. Finally, this research examined the relationships between the measures of
boundary extension, imagery, and emotion. The results suggest that individual differences in
emotional ability and object, but not spatial, imagery could be associated with boundary
extension in face processing.
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Introduction
Boundary extension (BE) is a common false memory error, in which people conﬁdently
remember seeing a wider angle view of the scene than was actually viewed. They recall the
surrounding regions of the scene, which were not visible during the encoding. BE is a
constrained phenomenon, and scene extrapolation occurs just beyond the edges of a view
(Gottesman & Intraub, 1999; Intraub & Richardson, 1989). This phenomenon is thought to
comprise a two-stage process. First, a spontaneous extrapolation beyond the visible
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boundaries occurs during the initial encoding of an encountered scene. This happens due to a
constructive nature of perception. It was suggested that the limited view of a scene activates a
perceptual schema or a constructed visual-spatial representation of the expected layout
outside the view (Chadwick, Mullally, & Maguire, 2013; Intraub, Bender, & Mangels,
1992; Intraub, Gottesman, & Bills, 1998). Subsequently, during the retrieval, BE manifests
as a false memory error. In contrast to the traditional model of scene perception, which
postulates that visual input is a single source of information in scene representation, the
multisource model of scene perception proposes that scene perception involves processing
in multiple modalities, one of which is vision (Intraub, 2010, 2012). According to the
multisource model, scene perception is based on spatial egocentric framework. Multiple
sources of input (e.g., visual sensory, amodal, conceptual, and contextual) ‘ﬁll-in’ this
framework with expectations about the surrounding visual ﬁeld, which is only partially
revealed in a picture. Thus, mental scene extrapolation does not happen after the stimulus
is gone but already occurs during the scene presentation. In this view, BE is a source
monitoring error (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) that arises due to the confusion
between original sensory input and internally generated detail (Seamon, Schlegel, Hiester,
Landau, & Blumenthal, 2002) and the attempts to determine which portion of the scene
matches to the visual source. BE is considered to be a highly adaptive process that
contributes to the representation of continuity and coherence of the world that exists
beyond the limited visual input (Chadwick et al., 2013; Mullally, Intraub, & Maguire, 2012).
This phenomenon is remarkably robust. A variety of diﬀerent methods, such as drawing
from memory, recognition/rating of images that contain more or less of the original scene, or
border-adjustment, consistently demonstrated BE eﬀect (Hubbard, Hutchison, & Courtney,
2010; Intraub & Bodamer, 1993; Intraub, Hoﬀman, Wetherhold, & Stoehs, 2006). It was
found in people of various ages, including 3- to 7-month infants and adults up to 84 years of
age (Quinn & Intraub, 2007; Seamon et al., 2002). BE was observed for a wide range of target
durations (250ms to 15 s, Gottesman & Intraub, 2002; Intraub, Gottesman, Willey, & Zuk,
1996) and retention intervals (42ms to 8 days, Intraub & Dickinson, 2008; Intraub &
Richardson, 1989; Safer, Christianson, Autry, & O¨sterlund, 1998). It is not limited to
rectangular images but occurs for diﬀerent shapes such as circular or irregular (Daniels &
Intraub, 2006). BE is so robust that it is not eliminated even by the awareness of this
phenomenon, though, test-informed instruction may lead to a reduction in BE (Gagnier,
Dickinson, & Intraub, 2013; Intraub & Bodamer, 1993).
However, despite its robustness, BE does not occur for all kinds of image contents. It was
found primarily for images containing a background surface, but not for images with
depictions on blank backgrounds (Intraub et al., 1998). This was explained by the role of
mental schema anticipating the continuous layout beyond the frame and not activating for
images that do not depict partial view of a scene (Intraub et al., 1998). The hypothesis that
BE occurs due to object completion was ruled out because this phenomenon was observed
even for scenes that did not contain incomplete cropped objects (Intraub et al., 1992; Intraub
& Bodamer, 1993). Besides, BE did not diﬀer for scenes containing whole objects and
cropped objects (Gagnier et al., 2013). BE was suggested to occur only for limited
boundaries of the view, but not in response to isolated objects removed from the context
background (Gottesman & Intraub, 2002, 2003). Though, there is contrary evidence that BE
may occur for abstract scenes containing ﬁgures on a white blank background (McDunn,
Siddiqui, & Brown, 2014). BE was suggested to be speciﬁc to representation of scenes or
images that convey scene structure (Intraub et al., 1998). A scene is generally deﬁned as a
continuous spatial layout, which extends beyond the visible boundaries, while a nonscene
refers to an isolated object, which is not embedded in a spatial context (Hubbard et al., 2010).
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More generally, a scene is deﬁned as a depiction of a truncated view of a continuous world
(Gottesman & Intraub, 2002). In this sense, cropped faces may be perceived, similarly to
scenes, as truncated views of a full body extending beyond the edges of the perceived view
(Intraub & Richardson, 1989).
Indeed, BE phenomenon was observed for a variety scene contents, including scenes with
single or multiple objects, scenes with cropped and noncropped objects, and even abstract
representations (Intraub & Bodamer, 1993; Intraub & Richardson, 1989; McDunn et al.,
2014). However, the majority of studies did not focus on examination of BE in nonscenes.
Possibly, BE may occur in response to some categories of nonscene objects, and in particular,
to a very special kind of images, such as faces (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998).
Although human bodies and faces were sometimes included in the studied scenes (Gallagher,
Balas, Matheny, & Sinha, 2005; Intraub et al., 2006; Me´ne´trier, Didierjean, & Vieillard, 2013;
Munger & Multhaup, 2016), no research speciﬁcally focused on BE in face representations.
There is some evidence that presence of humans and human faces may aﬀect BE. For
example, Gallagher et al. (2005) found an intriguing interaction between the background
complexity and the presence of a person. When scenes contained a human, the amount of BE
linearly increased with the complexity of the background, whereas for scenes without a
human, the simplest and the most complex scenes yielded the highest amounts of BE.
Overall, investigation of faces seems to be an overlooked dimension in the research on BE.
Thus, the main purpose of the present study was to extend the existing knowledge on BE for
nonscene images by examining this phenomenon in face processing.
Although a large body of evidence supports cognitive and neurological dissociation in
processing faces and scenes, there is also research suggesting that processing of faces and
scenes shares a lot of similarities. Functional magnetic resonance imaging research (Haxby
et al., 2001; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; McCarthy, Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997)
indicated that face processing is underpinned by the inferior occipital gyrus and lateral
fusiform gyrus (also known as ‘‘Fusiform Face Area’’ or FFA). Lateral Occipital Cortex
and FFA were found to have selective response to images of faces, but not those of houses or
places (Kanwisher et al., 1997; Levy, Hasson, Avidan, Hendler, & Malach, 2001). In contrast,
so-called Parahippocampal Place Area (PPA) was found to respond strongly to depictions of
places, including indoor and outdoor scenes, and to respond weaker to buildings, but not to
faces (Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998). Previously published research indicated the crucial role of
hippocampus in scene viewing and processing spatial locations (Bird & Burgess, 2008).
Neuropsychological literature documented cases of hippocampal damage followed by a
selective impairment of scene recognition and intact face memory (Carlesimo, Fadda,
Turriziani, Tomaiuolo, & Caltagirone, 2001; Taylor, Henson, & Graham, 2007). In
addition, it was found that face processing relied on a detailed central scrutiny and was
more strongly associated with processing of central information, whereas representations
of buildings or scenes involved more peripheral information (Kanwisher, 2001; Levy et al.,
2001). Neuroimaging research conﬁrmed that BE is underpinned by the scene-selective
regions of the brain.
Chadwick et al. (2013) indicated the crucial role of hippocampus in anticipation and
construction of scenes, as well as in extrapolation of scenes beyond their physical borders.
Research emphasized the role of hippocampus in construction of scenes both in memory
and the imagination (Zeidman, Mullally, & Maguire, 2014). Mullally et al. (2012) found
that patients with selective bilateral damage to hippocampus demonstrated less BE errors
than control participants, supporting the role of hippocampus in BE. Inconsistent with
this ﬁnding, Kim, Dede, Hopkins, and Squire (2015) found that amnestic patients
with hippocampal damage exhibited BE similarly to healthy controls. Furthermore,
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Park, Intraub, Yi, Widders, and Chun (2007) demonstrated that BE task causes selective
activation in the PPA, a region associated with processing scenes such as landscapes or
buildings (Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998), but not in the Lateral Occipital Cortex, typically
associated with object recognition (Grill-Spector et al., 1999).
Although many studies found the dissociation between face and place processing (Epstein
& Kanwisher, 1998; Kanwisher et al., 1997; Levy et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2007), there is also
evidence that faces and places share neural underpinnings, for example, involvement of the
ventral temporal cortex (Haxby et al., 2001). In addition, prosopagnosia (inability to
recognize the faces) often co-occurs with topographical prosopagnosia (Landis, Cummings,
Benson, & Palmer, 1986). Overall, given the earlier distinction between face and scene
processing as well as the evidence of BE underpinnings by scene-selective brain areas, it
could be possible that BE may not occur in response to faces. However, a cropped face
image may elicit the sense of continuation beyond the picture boundaries (Intraub et al.,
1992), similar to how a close-up portrait (disembodied head) may be interpreted as a
continuous scene that includes the lower parts of the body (Intraub & Richardson, 1989).
Possibly, a close-up face image may perform as a scene, and when being cropped, it may
enforce the perception of continuity and mental reconstruction of a coherent representation
in the same way as the truncated scene does. The present study aimed to examine whether BE
can be observed for cropped face images. Particularly, to examine BE for faces rather than
scenes, face images were presented on black backgrounds.
Furthermore, the present work examined whether there is an asymmetry of BE in face
processing. Although BE typically occurs for all boundaries of an image, for example, four
edges of a photograph (Intraub & Richardson, 1989), the asymmetry in BE, for example,
diﬀerent amounts of expansion at diﬀerent sides of an image, was demonstrated by previous
studies. In particular, BE was found to enlarge in the direction of the implied/anticipated
motion, but not in the opposite direction (Courtney & Hubbard, 2004). Furthermore, a
greater BE was found for the objects that typically move faster than for the objects that
typically move slower (e.g., airplane vs. automobile). These ﬁndings may be explained by the
role of BE in facilitation of the subsequent scene recognition (Dickinson & Intraub, 2008).
For instance, anticipating a movement may increase BE in the expected direction and may
aid spatial integration of the successive views (Hubbard et al., 2010). Similarly, implied
motion in frozen-motion pictures and abrupt disappearance of a moving target cause
displacement in memory toward the direction of motion (Freyd, 1983; Freyd & Finke,
1984; Futterweit & Beilin, 1994). Hubbard (1996) highlighted the similarity between BE
and representational momentum, that is, displacement in memory of a moving target
beyond the true ﬁnal location. However, Munger, Owens, and Conway (2005) showed that
BE and representational momentum are separate processes. They found that establishing the
spatial layout occurs before the continuation of movement within a scene and concluded that
BE cannot be due to a displacement in depth. Another evidence of asymmetry in BE comes
from experiments using attentional cueing. As it was demonstrated by Intraub et al. (2006),
BE can be aﬀected by planned eye ﬁxations: while BE appeared on the cued (to-be-ﬁxated)
side of the image, it was inhibited on the uncued side. Inconsistent with this ﬁnding, research
demonstrated that focal and increased attention may constrain BE error (Dickinson &
Intraub, 2009; Intraub, Daniel, Horowitz, & Wolfe, 2008). Overall, these ﬁndings implied
that asymmetry in scene representation may be caused by the anticipatory processing in a
certain direction.
The present work tested the hypothesis that asymmetry in BE may exist for diﬀerent facial
parts. This prediction was made based on the evidence for asymmetry in attention to diﬀerent
regions of a face. In particular, previous research demonstrated that upper face regions
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attract more attention than lower face parts (James, Huh, & Kim, 2010; McKelvie, 1976).
Goldstein and Mackenberg (1966) examined the recognition of isolated portions of faces and
demonstrated that upper portions of the face are more important for identiﬁcation than
lower portions. Most probably, this asymmetry in attention occurs because the eyes are
the most salient and socially important part of the face (Janik, Wellens, Goldberg, &
Dell’Osso, 1978). Our gaze naturally focuses on eyes and mouth face regions (Janik et al.,
1978; Mertens, Siegmund, & Grusser, 1993; Walker-Smith, Gale, & Findlay, 1977; Yarbus,
1967), which are crucial for face identiﬁcation and memorization and play important role in
social communication (Ellis, 1975). Mouth region is also important but less salient than
‘‘eyes’’ region (McKelvie, 1976; Pellicano, Rhodes, & Peters, 2006). Markedly, the
consistent looking preference for the upper part versus lower face part was not found for
scenes (James et al., 2010). It was proposed that common conﬁguration for faces determines
top-focused pattern of exploration, whereas no such stereotypic patterns exist for scene
exploration. Thus, due to asymmetry in attention in processing top versus lower facial
parts, it was expected in the present research to ﬁnd the corresponding top versus bottom
asymmetry in BE of cropped face images. In addition, the present hypothesis about
asymmetry of BE in face processing was inspired by the portrait composition ‘‘rules’’ from
photography and visual arts, which put certain limitations on framing faces. There are
common recommendations suggesting ‘‘good’’ places to crop and those to avoid. In
particular, a crop is acceptable in a forehead area; however, it is advised to be avoided in
a chin area. For example, according to Peterson (2016), the creator of Digital Photo Secrets
website, ‘‘We are used to seeing pictures of people with the top of their head cropped oﬀ. It
typically looks ﬁne. The same cannot be said for the bottom of the face – do not remove
someone’s chin!’’ The present study aimed to explore whether the location of a crop in face
representation (forehead vs. chin) aﬀects BE. Based on Intraub et al. (2006) ﬁndings, which
indicate that BE can be ampliﬁed on the attended part of an image, it can be predicted that
BE would be greater for the top (forehead) than for the lower (chin) part of the head.
Alternatively, consistent with Intraub et al. (2008) study, which observed that focal
attention may constrain BE, a greater attention to the upper part of the head may result
in a reduction of BE. Gagnier et al. (2013) recorded oculomotor activity to study the
mechanisms underlying the reduction in BE and to examine whether BE reﬂects a lack of
eye ﬁxations near the edges of a picture. They contrasted cropped and whole-objects stimuli
and assumed that the cropped area creates a salient marker of boundary placement. The
reduction in BE was expected at the side where the object was cropped with a picture
boundary due to increased attention to the crop area. However, Gagnier et al. found that
there was no diﬀerence in ﬁxations to the boundary and to the cropped region. BE occurred
in spite of multiple ﬁxations to the boundary region and regardless whether the objects were
cropped or not. In the present study, the oculomotor behavior was recorded to examine the
distribution of attention. Consistent with ﬁndings of greater attention to upper face regions
(James et al., 2010; McKelvie, 1976), it was expected to observe a higher oculomotor activity
in the top part of the face, including eyes and cropped boundary regions. In addition, the
present study explored the possible asymmetry in BE for lower versus upper parts of the face.
Finally, the present research intended to explore face BE in relation to imagery. Mental
imagery seems to have a special importance in understanding mechanisms of BE. It was
suggested that scene continuity activates schematic expectations representing the visual
world beyond the picture boundaries, and such mental schema underlies not only
perception and memory but also imagination of scenes (Intraub, 1997). Intraub et al.
(1998) proposed that BE may occur regardless whether perception or imagination
activated the perceptual schema. Indeed, a great body of evidence demonstrated the
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similarity between perception and imagery, which share common representations, cognitive
mechanisms, and neural underpinnings (Farah, 1988; Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004;
Kosslyn et al., 1999; Shepard & Metzler, 1971). In particular, O’Craven and Kanwisher
(2000) found that imagery of faces and places activated the same stimulus-speciﬁc brain
regions (FFA and PPA) as in perception, but the magnitude of activation was lower for
imagery than for perception. Although visual imagery and perception showed signiﬁcant
overlap, research highlighted that imagery involves more top-down processing and more
prefrontal cortex involvement than perception (Ganis et al., 2004; Mechelli, Price, Friston,
& Ishai, 2004). Hubbard et al. (2010) showed that early visual processing areas were not
involved in BE and proposed that BE is underpinned by high-level processes. These ﬁndings
highlight the possible role of mental imagery in BE. However, previous studies provided only
limited evidence about the relationship between imagery and BE. In particular, research
examined how imagery instructions may inﬂuence BE. Although BE was found primarily
for images containing a background surface but not for those with blank backgrounds
(Intraub et al., 1998), imagery instructions altered these ﬁndings. In particular, BE was
observed when participants were deliberately imagining extended backgrounds around
objects on blank backgrounds (Gottesman & Intraub, 2002). Imagery may make people
believe that they have experienced some events that they have not experienced (Loftus,
2003). Yet, it was proposed that the act of imagination per se does not always increase
source memory errors. Foley, Foy, Schlemmer, and Belser-Ehrlich (2010) demonstrated
that, in contrast to spontaneous imagery instructions, deliberate imagery instructions may
even decrease source memory errors. Foley et al. claimed that the awareness about the act of
generating the images might distinguish these imagined items from the actually seen items,
thus leading to reduced source memory errors. Using a variety of imagery instructions,
Munger and Multhaup (2016) found that explicit imagination of sensory details in the
scene does not result in increased BE. They concluded that there is no imagination eﬀect
on BE.
While the majority of studies on imagery and BE primarily focused on the eﬀect of
imagery instructions on BE, there were only few attempts to explore the relationship
between BE and individual diﬀerences in imagery. Previous literature reported individual
diﬀerences in visual-object (visualizing pictorial appearances in terms of shape, color, and
texture) and visual-spatial (visualizing spatial relations and transformations) imagery
(Kozhevnikov & Blazhenkova, 2013; Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn, & Shephard, 2005). In
particular, Kozhevnikov et al. distinguished between two types of individuals: object and
spatial visualizers. Object visualizers tend to experience vivid and colorful mental images and
to excel in object visualization tasks (e.g., recognizing degraded objects), whereas spatial
visualizers tend to use imagery for representing spatial relations and transformations and
to excel in tasks that require spatial visualization (e.g., mental rotation). This distinction in
individual diﬀerences in imagery was based on evidence of the dissociation between ventral
‘‘visual-object’’ and dorsal ‘‘visual-spatial’’ pathways in the brain, underpinning processing
of diﬀerent aspects of visual information (Farah, Hammond, Levine, & Calvanio, 1988;
Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992; Mazard, Tzourio-Mazoyer, Crivello, Mazoyer, & Mellet, 2004;
Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994). The relationship between BE and individual diﬀerences in
object versus spatial visual imagery was examined by Munger and Multhaup (2016). Using
the Object-Spatial Imagery Questionnaire (OSIQ), assessing object and spatial imagery
(Blajenkova, Kozhevnikov, & Motes, 2006), Munger and Multhaup found a signiﬁcant
positive correlation between spatial imagery and BE, but not between object imagery and
BE. The authors concluded that BE might be related to a superior visual-spatial rather than
visual-object imagery ability. In addition, there is evidence that individual diﬀerences in
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spatial but not object imagery are related to spatial dispersion of eye movements during the
recall of scenes (Johansson, Holsanova, & Holmqvist, 2011). Furthermore, Mullally et al.
(2012) asked participants to visualize in their imagination the scenes extending beyond the
current view and to rate the vividness of their subjective imagery. Researchers found that
patients with selective bilateral hippocampal lesions had signiﬁcant impairments in the ability
to visually imagine spatially coherent scenes (e.g., spatial relationships and locations).
Markedly, the same patients demonstrated attenuated BE (thus, better memory) than
control participants. These ﬁndings indicate that the subjective vividness of scene imagery
may be associated with the increased BE. It is important to note that Mullally et al. (2012)
measured vividness associated with imagination of spatially coherent scenes. As reported in
Blazhenkova (2016), vividness that refers to imagery of spatial properties (locations, spatial
structure, and relationships) versus pictorial object properties (color, texture, and shape)
constitute separate, spatial and object, vividness dimensions. Thus, the results of Mullally
et al. (2012) may be interpreted as a ﬁnding of the relationship between spatial imagery and
BE for scenes.
At the same time, the existing evidence suggests the possibility of positive association
between object imagery and BE. While some studies demonstrated that vivid and pictorial
object imagery may facilitate memory (Marks, 1973; Vannucci, Pelagatti, Chiorri, &
Mazzoni, 2016), other literature showed that the elaboration of sensory details during the
encoding leads to the increase in source memory errors (Thomas, Bulevich, & Loftus, 2003).
Research has suggested that vivid and rich in sensory detail imagery experiences may lead to
later confusion between real and imagined experiences, causing false memory errors
(Gonsalves & Paller, 2000; Gonsalves et al., 2004). Markham and Hynes (1993) found the
relationship between individual vividness of imagery and memory errors in a task that,
during the encoding, required to imagine half-shapes as complete symmetrical geometric
forms. The participants were divided in ‘‘high-imagery’’ and ‘‘low-imagery’’ groups,
according to their scores on Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks,
1973). During the recall of shapes, high-imagery participants made more reality
monitoring errors, confusing half-shapes with complete shapes, than low-imagery
participants. Notably, in contrast to Mullally et al. (2012) assessing spatial vividness, the
VVIQ instrument (Marks, 1973) measures object vividness (Blajenkova et al., 2006;
Blazhenkova, 2016). Therefore, the results of Markham and Hynes may be interpreted as
a ﬁnding of the relationship between object imagery vividness and mental extrapolation
errors for objects (symmetrical shapes), but not for scenes. Besides, numerous reports
provided evidence that higher VVIQ scores were associated with higher reality monitoring
errors and false memory (Dobson & Markham, 1993; Gonsalves et al., 2004; Hyman &
Pentland, 1996; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003). Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that vividness
and strength of individual imagery may lead to increased BE errors. However, it is not yet
known how BE may be aﬀected by the type of imagery (object vs. spatial) and the content of
the image (a single object on a blank background vs. scene). The present work examined the
relationship between BE and individual diﬀerences in the two types of imagery: object versus
spatial. The present investigation implemented nonspatial stimuli: faces on blank
backgrounds. On the basis of the previous literature, it was expected that larger BE in face
processing would be associated with superior object, but not spatial, visual imagery.
In addition, because the present research used face stimuli conveying emotions, the
measures of emotional processing were also included along with the imagery assessments.
Previous studies indicated that, similar to vividness, emotional content might induce the
creation of false memories (Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Porter, Spencer, & Birt, 2003).
However, the evidence regarding the relationship between emotional processing and BE is
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quite controversial. Several studies suggested that BE eﬀect may depend on the emotional
content of scenes. For example, Me´ne´trier et al. (2013) demonstrated that positively valenced
stimuli (i.e., actors showing happiness and pleasure through facial and postural expressions)
led to BE eﬀect, whereas negatively valenced stimuli (i.e., expressing anger and irritation) did
not produce directional memory distortion. Safer et al. (1998) showed that negative
emotional content of an image may lead to ‘‘tunnel memory eﬀect’’ or boundary
restriction (BR), opposite to BE eﬀect. However, other research found no diﬀerence in
magnitude of BE for pictures with emotionally neutral and emotionally charged content
(Candel, Merckelbach, Houben, & Vandyck, 2004; Candel, Merckelbach, & Zandbergen,
2003). Mathews and Mackintosh (2004) found that scene extrapolation interacts with
individual diﬀerences in emotionality: BE for very negative scenes was reduced in high-
trait-anxious individuals. Blazhenkova and Kozhevnikov (2010) indicated positive
association between individual diﬀerences in emotion and object, but not spatial, imagery.
Therefore, in the present study, it was expected that both, individual diﬀerences in emotional
ability and object imagery, similar to each other, would be positively related to BE in face
processing.
To summarize, there is an increasing body of research on BE in scene perception and
memory. However, there are gaps in the knowledge regarding BE for nonscene
representations, and in particular, face images. The present work examined BE errors in
face processing using cropped face images on black backgrounds. Study 1 explored BE in
diﬀerent facial parts. Using short-term and long-term memory conditions, it examined
whether the location of a crop (forehead vs. chin) aﬀects BE. Study 2 examined the
relationships between the measures of BE in face images and diﬀerent assessments of
individual diﬀerences in object/spatial imagery and emotion.
Study 1
The goal of Study 1 was to examine BE using face stimuli, cropped either in a forehead or
chin. The task was administered in two memory conditions to explore the robustness and the
possible diﬀerences in BE eﬀect. On the basis of previous research that showed BE for both
long-term and short-term retention (Intraub & Dickinson, 2008; Safer et al., 1998), it was
expected to ﬁnd this eﬀect in both memory conditions. The early onset of BE indicates that
this phenomenon occurs at the border between perceiving and remembering (Intraub &
Dickinson, 2008; Roediger, 1996). The comparison between the long-term and short-term
memory conditions could elucidate the role of perception and memory in BE. Furthermore, it
was hypothesized that participants would make BE errors for both crop locations. However,
based on the attentional asymmetry in face processing, forehead extension was expected to be
diﬀerent from chin extension. In addition, this study explored the eﬀect of the expressed
emotion on scene extrapolation. Eye-tracking data were collected alongside with the task
performance data.
Method
Participants. Eighty-three1 participants were Sabancı University students (19–26 years old,
M age¼ 22). Participants were run either in the short-term memory (22 males, 19 females)
or in the long-term (19 males, 23 females) condition. They were reimbursed with course
credits for their participation. The research was approved by the Sabanci University
Research Ethics Council. All participants provided written informed consent.
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Materials and procedure. All participants were tested individually. They completed either a
short-term or a long-term condition of the Faces Task. This task included Encoding &
Emotional Identiﬁcation and Recognition parts. During the Encoding, participants
observed photographs of faces, cropped either in a forehead or in a chin area. The stimuli
were created based on Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces picture set (Lundqvist, Flykt, &
O¨hman, 1998). They comprised color pictures of female faces displaying six diﬀerent
emotional states (anger, disgust, happiness, neutrality, sadness, and surprise) photographed
from the front. Each emotional state was presented in four diﬀerent faces (two cropped in the
forehead and two in the chin area), thus making 24 pictures in total. The same Encoding face
stimuli were used in both conditions. Forehead- and chin-cropped faces had ﬁxed width, but
varied in height. The height of full uncropped original Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces
images corresponded to the full height of the screen. The cropped stimuli were shifted so that
the bottom of forehead-cropped faces touched the bottom of the screen, and the top of chin-
cropped faces touched the top of the screen, thus leaving some space for a mental
continuation of a cropped part. Each face appeared for 4 s, and it was followed by
Emotional Identiﬁcation.
The instruction included two parts. The Encoding & Emotional Identiﬁcation instruction
was as follows: You will see 24 pictures of people with diﬀerent facial expressions. Try to
identify the emotions conveyed in each of these photos. After each face presentation, you will
be automatically taken to the page with a question about this face emotion. During the
Emotional Identiﬁcation, participants were asked, ‘‘What was the emotion expressed by
this face?’’ They had to select among the seven answer options: ‘‘fear,’’ ‘‘anger,’’ ‘‘disgust,’’
‘‘happiness,’’ ‘‘neutral,’’ ‘‘sadness,’’ and ‘‘surprise.’’ The answer time was not limited, and
program proceeded to the next trial after the response. The recognition of the emotional
expressions was included in the Faces Task to encourage participants focusing on the other
face properties rather than local areas of crops and to separate the presentation of the
Encoding and Recognition face stimuli.
The second part of the instruction was as follows: You will see the same picture again
among the other options. Try to recognize the picture that you saw before. Select this picture
by clicking your mouse on it. During the Recognition, participants had to recognize the
previously seen images and to make a forced-choice selection among the four options.
During the ﬁrst trial of the Emotional Identiﬁcation task, to ensure that a participant
understands the task, the experimenter noted and showed that, though, all the choice
images represent the same face, but the crop area is diﬀerent. These selection options
included the same faces with two extended and two reduced crops, representing diﬀerent
degrees of possible BE and BR errors. To increase the sensitivity of the test, none of the
answer options were the same as an image presented during the Encoding (so there was no
correct answer option). Some other BE studies also did not include the selection option
identical to the studied view (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2004; Quinn & Intraub, 2007). For
example, Mathews and Mackintosh (2004) used a forced-choice recognition task that
presented four alternatives with diﬀerent degrees of BE and restriction but did not present
the originally memorized scene. Remarkably, research on eyewitness memories demonstrated
that participants conﬁdently and falsely identiﬁed someone in the lineup of potential suspects
as being the perpetrator, when the actual perpetrator was not in the lineup (Wells et al.,
1998).
In the short-term memory condition, both parts of the instruction were presented prior
to start of the test. In the long-term condition, the second part of the instruction came after
each block of Encoding & Emotional Identiﬁcation. In the short-term memory condition,
each Encoding image was immediately followed by the Emotional Identiﬁcation and then
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Recognition (Figure 1). The response time for Emotional Identiﬁcation was not limited and
not recorded. Pilot participants testing showed that it took approximately 3 to 10 s. Because
the time interval between the stimuli Encoding and Recognition did not exceed 30 s, this
condition was labeled as ‘‘short-term’’ memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). In the long-term
memory condition, the encoding images were presented in four blocks, each containing six
trials. Each Encoding block was followed by a Recognition block. This condition required
long-term memory because the time interval between the Encoding and Recognition stimuli
exceeded 30 s (Atkinson & Shiﬀrin, 1968; Baddeley & Warrington, 1970).
The same Recognition alternatives were used in both conditions. However, in the short-
memory condition, half of the Recognition options increased in size from right to left,
reﬂecting the magnitude of BE/BR in the solution options (i.e., Large BR, Small BR,
Small BE, Large BE), and another half had the reversed order. In the long-memory
condition, all choice options increased in size from right to left. To have a visual diversity
in the selection options, the size of the face crops varied, and it was balanced between the chin
and forehead areas. The face width was constant between the four alternative options.
However, because faces were cropped diﬀerently in either forehead or chin, their heights
were diﬀerent. The order of face images with varying crop locations was intermixed. It
was ﬁxed for the Encoding and Recognition, which allowed to keep the time between the
corresponding encoding and Recognition stimuli for the same face relatively constant.
Behavioral responses (mouse clicks on the selected pictures) were recorded.2 The response
time for Recognition was not limited. Eye-tracking data were collected using Tobii TX300
Eye Tracker (data rate 120, framerate 5, ﬁxation ﬁlter I-VT) and Tobbi Studio software.
Stimuli were presented full-screen on a 23’’ monitor at a resolution of 1,920 1,080 pixels.
Results - Behavioral Data
Types of errors during the Recognition. For the Recognition data analysis, Regions of Interest
(ROIs) were created around each answer option (Figure 2). Because none of the answer
options represented a correct answer, the Recognition was analyzed in terms of diﬀerent
types of errors (i.e., Large BE, Small BE, Small BR, and Large BR), corresponding to the
Figure 1. Schematic of trial and block sequences in the short-term and long-term conditions of the
Faces Task.
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four answer options. Error Frequency was the number of mouse clicks on diﬀerent
Recognition options. The two types of BE answers and the two types of BR answers were
obtained in the forced-choice task, leading to two categories of responses: Extension and
Restriction Errors. The mean frequencies of responses falling in these two categories were
further compared for faces cropped in the forehead or chin areas.
Recognition analysis. Amixed 2 2 2 three-way (twowithin- and one between-subjects factors)
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to assess the impact of two repeated measures
variables, Error Type (BE, BR) and cropping Location (Forehead, Chin), on participants’
recognition (Error Frequency), across the two memory Conditions (Short-Term, Long-
Term).3 The adjustment for multiple comparisons was done with Bonferroni correction. The
analysis revealed a considerable main eﬀect for Error Type, F(1, 81)¼ 71.757, p< .001, partial
Z2¼ .470, showing that participants selected more extension (M¼ 7.617, SE¼ 0.191) and less
restriction (M¼ 4.383, SE¼ 0.191) answer options. There was a signiﬁcant but weak
interaction between Error Type and Location, F(1, 81)¼ 4.562, p¼ .036, partial Z2¼ .053,
suggesting that Error Type eﬀect diﬀered depending on the cropping Location. While the
extension eﬀect was present for both locations of crop, it was greater for forehead-cropped
images (MDBE-BR¼ 3.922, SE¼ 0.464, p< .001; MBE¼ 7.961, SE¼ 0.232; MBR¼ 4.039,
SE¼ 0.232) than for chin-cropped (MDBE-BR¼ 2.546, SE¼ 0.532, p< .001; MBE¼ 7.273,
SE¼ 0.266; MBR¼ 4.727, SE¼ 0.266) images. There was no interaction between Error Type
and Condition, F(1, 81)¼ 1.380, p¼ .243, partial Z2¼ .017, suggesting no diﬀerence in the
Error Type eﬀect between the short-term and long-term conditions. There was a weak but
signiﬁcant Error TypeLocationCondition interaction, F(1, 81)¼ 11.511, p¼ .001, partial
Z2¼ .124. A separate analysis for two conditions revealed that forehead versus chin asymmetry
of BE eﬀect was present in short-term condition, F(1, 40)¼ 15.426, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .278,
but not in the long-term condition, F(1, 41)¼ .783, p¼ .381, partialZ2¼ .019. Figure 3 presents
mean Error Frequencies of BE and BR responses for both conditions.
The effect of Emotion. The possible eﬀect of Emotion on boundary extrapolation in cropped face
images was additionally explored. A mixed 6 2 2 three-way ANOVA was conducted to
assess the impact of Emotion (Anger, Disgust, Happiness, Neural, Sadness, Surprise) and
Error Type on Error Frequency, across the two memory Conditions.4 The adjustment for
multiple comparisons was done with Bonferroni correction. The analysis revealed a main
eﬀect of Error Type, F(1, 81)¼ 41.819, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .340, demonstrating BE eﬀect.
There was no interaction between Error Type and Condition, F(1, 81)¼ 1.019, p¼ .316, partial
Z2¼ .012. There was a weak but signiﬁcant interaction between Emotion and Error Type, F(5,
Figure 2. ROIs around different types of Recognition errors in the Faces Task.
ROIs¼Regions of Interest.
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405)¼ 7.895, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .089, suggesting that Error Type eﬀect depended on the
Emotion. This interaction eﬀect was analyzed using a simple main eﬀects analysis. Pairwise
comparisons of the EmotionError Type interaction revealed thatMean Diﬀerence (BE-BR)
was signiﬁcant only for ‘‘Angry’’ (MDBE-BR¼ 1.015, SE¼ 0.220, p< .001); ‘‘Happy’’ (MDBE-
BR¼ 1.424, SE¼ 0.221, p< .001); ‘‘Sad’’ (MDBE-BR¼ .891, SE¼ 0.227, p< .001); and
‘‘Surprise’’ (MDBE-BR¼ 1.034, SE¼ 0.212, p< .001) emotions. Furthermore, to compare the
size of BE eﬀect for diﬀerent types of emotions, the additional repeated measures analysis with
BE-BR as a dependent measure and Emotion as a within-subjects variable. Pairwise
comparisons revealed that BE-BR diﬀerence for ‘‘Happy’’ emotion was signiﬁcantly larger
compared with BE-BR for ‘‘Disgust’’ (MD¼ 1.036, SE¼ 0.298, p¼ .012) and ‘‘Neutral’’
(MD¼ 1.494, SE¼ 0.261, p< .001) emotions. BE-BR discrepancy was signiﬁcantly smaller
for ‘‘Neutral’’ emotion compared with BE-BR for ‘‘Angry’’ (MD¼1.084, SE¼ 0.262,
p¼ .001), ‘‘Sad’’ (MD¼.964, SE¼ 0.241, p¼ .002), and ‘‘Surprise’’ (MD¼1.108,
SE¼ 0.273, p¼ .002) emotions. Figure 3 shows mean Error Frequencies of BE and BR
answers for diﬀerent types of emotions. In addition, for a clearer demonstration of Error
Type eﬀect for each emotion, this ﬁgure displays mean diﬀerence between BE and BR
measures (BE-BR). There was no interaction between Emotion, Error Type, and Condition,
F(5, 405)¼ 1.381, p¼ .231, partial Z2¼ .017.
Results - Eye-Tracking Data
Encoding analysis. To analyze the visual processing during the Encoding, ﬁve ROIs were
created for each cropped face image: ‘‘cropped’’ area, ‘‘border’’ area, ‘‘eyes’’ area,
‘‘mouth’’ area, and ‘‘noncropped’’ face area. As illustrated on the Figure 4, the ‘‘cropped’’
ROI was deﬁned as a missing part of a face, whereas ‘‘noncropped’’ ROI was the area above
the ‘‘eyes’’ in chin-cropped images or the area below the ‘‘mouth’’ the forehead-cropped
Figure 3. Recognition data: Error Frequencies for different types of errors in the Faces Task.
ROI¼Region of Interest; BE¼Boundary Extension; BR¼ Boundary Restriction.
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faces. The ‘‘eyes’’ ROI was created around the eyes, between the top of the alar nasal sulcus
and just above the superciliary arch. The ‘‘mouth’’ ROI included the area below the ‘‘eyes’’
ROI and mentolabial sulcus. The ‘‘border’’ ROI included the area between the ‘‘eyes’’ and
‘‘cropped’’ ROIs in the forehead-cropped faces or area between the ‘‘mouth’’ and ‘‘cropped’’
ROIs in the in chin-cropped images. Two diﬀerent eye-tracking metrics, based on the ROIs
deﬁned in Figure 4, were used in the analysis. Visit Duration was the total time in seconds
spent within a particular ROI. Visit Count was the total number of visits to an ROI, where
visit is deﬁned as a time interval between the ﬁrst ﬁxation inside the ROI and the next ﬁxation
outside the ROI.
A mixed 5 2 2 three-way (two within- and one between-subjects factors) ANOVA was
conducted to assess the impact of two repeated measures variables, Face Area (‘‘cropped,’’
‘‘border,’’ ‘‘eyes,’’ ‘‘mouth,’’ ‘‘noncropped’’) and cropping Location (Forehead, Chin), on
oculomotor variables (Visit Duration, Visit Count) across the two Conditions (Short-Term,
Long-Term). The adjustment for multiple comparisons was done with Bonferroni correction.
The data were analyzed separately for Visit Duration and Visit Count. Eye-tracking heat
maps representing relative visit durations during the Encoding are presented in Figure 5.
The analysis of Visit Duration revealed a substantial main eﬀect for Face Area,
F(4, 324)¼ 259.601, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .762. Pairwise comparisons demonstrated that
‘‘eyes’’ (M¼ 19.965, SE¼ 0.694) attracted signiﬁcantly more attention than any other face
areas all p’s< .001). The ‘‘mouth’’ was the second most salient area; mean Visit Duration was
signiﬁcantly greater for the ‘‘mouth’’ ROIs (M¼ 12.407, SE¼ 0.582) than for other ROIs (all
p’s< .001), except for the ‘‘eyes’’ areas. Visit Duration for ‘‘cropped’’ (M¼ 1.880, SE¼ 0.227)
and for ‘‘noncropped’’ (M¼ 2.736, SE¼ 0.226) areas were signiﬁcantly smaller than all other
ROIs (all p’s< .001), but not diﬀerent from each other (p¼ .087). Mean Visit Duration for
the ‘‘border’’ areas (M¼ 4.065, SE¼ 0.318) was greater than for the ‘‘noncropped’’ ROIs
(p¼ .005). The eﬀect of cropping Location was nonsigniﬁcant, F(1, 81)¼ 1.705, p¼ .195,
partial Z2¼ .021; there were no diﬀerence in Visit Duration between forehead- and chin-
cropped images. The eﬀect of Condition was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 81)¼ .094, p¼ .760, partial
Z2¼ .001. There was a signiﬁcant interaction between Face Area and cropping Location, F(4,
324)¼ 29.360, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .266, a signiﬁcant but weak interaction between Face
Area and Condition, F(4, 324)¼ 14.886, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .155, as well as a signiﬁcant
but weak interaction between Location and Condition, F(1, 81)¼ 18.751, p< .001, partial
Figure 4. ROIs around different parts of the face viewed during the Encoding of the Faces Task.
ROIs¼Regions of Interest.
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Z2¼ .188. Mean Visit Duration for the ‘‘cropped,’’ ‘‘border,’’ and ‘‘uncropped’’ areas was
greater in the short-term condition than in the long-term condition, but it was greater for the
‘‘eyes’’ area in the long-term condition than in the short-term condition (all p’s< .001). Face
AreaLocationCondition interaction was also signiﬁcant, F(4, 324)¼ 10.416, p< .001,
partial Z2¼ .114, indicating that the discrepancy in Face Area eﬀect between the forehead-
and chin-cropped images was diﬀerent in short and long-term conditions. In both conditions,
there were no diﬀerences in mean Visit Duration between the forehead versus chin areas for
the ‘‘cropped’’ and the ‘‘mouth’’ ROIs. For the ‘‘border’’ and the ‘‘eyes’’ ROIs’, Visit
Duration was greater for forehead- than for chin-cropped faces in the short-term
condition (p’s< .001), but not in the long-term condition. Mean Visit Duration for the
‘‘noncropped’’ ROIs’ was greater for the chin- than for the forehead-cropped faces in the
short-term condition (p< .001), but not in the long-term condition. Figure 6 demonstrates
the results of comparisons between mean Visit Duration for diﬀerent ROIs in the forehead-
and the chin-cropped faces, separately for the two conditions.
Figure 5. Encoding eye-tracking heatmaps representing relative Visit Duration in the short-term and long-
term conditions of the Faces Task.
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Consistent with Visit Duration, the analysis ofVisit Count revealed a substantial main eﬀect
for Face Area, F(4, 324)¼ 746.494, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .902. Pairwise comparisons
demonstrated that the ‘‘eyes’’ (M¼ 33.497, SE¼ 0.714) attracted signiﬁcantly more
attention than any other face areas all p’s< .001. The ‘‘Mouth’’ was the second most salient
area; mean Visit Count was signiﬁcantly greater for the ‘‘mouth’’ ROIs (M¼ 27.132,
SE¼ 0.758) than for the other ROIs (all p’s< .001), except for the ‘‘eyes’’ areas. Mean Visit
Count for the ‘‘cropped’’ areas (M¼ 3.481, SE¼ 0.325) was the smallest compared with all
other ROIs (all p’s< .001). There was no diﬀerence betweenmeanVisit Count for the ‘‘border’’
(M¼ 7.948, SE¼ 0.461) and the ‘‘noncropped’’ (M¼ 6.614, SE¼ 0.396) ROIs (p¼ .155). The
eﬀect of cropping Location was nonsigniﬁcant, F(1, 81)¼ 3.838, p¼ .054, partial Z2¼ .045.
The eﬀect of Condition was signiﬁcant but weak, F(1, 81)¼ 6.136, p¼ .015, partial Z2¼ .070.
Mean Visit Count was greater for the short-term (M¼ 16.568, SE¼ 0.479) than for the long-
term (M¼ 14.900, SE¼ 0.473) condition. There was a signiﬁcant interaction between Face
Area and Location, F(4, 324)¼ 53.325, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .397, as well as a signiﬁcant but
weak interaction between Face Area and Condition, F(4, 324)¼ 14.874, p< .001, partial
Z2¼ .155. Visit Count for the ‘‘cropped,’’ ‘‘border,’’ and ‘‘uncropped’’ areas was greater in
the short-term condition than in the long-term condition (all p’s< .001), but it was greater for
the ‘‘mouth’’ area in the long-term condition than in the short-term condition (p¼ .041). There
was no signiﬁcant interaction between Location and Condition, F(1, 81)¼ .090, p¼ .765,
partial Z2¼ .001. Face AreaLocationCondition interaction was signiﬁcant but weak,
F(4, 324)¼ 12.731, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .136. In both conditions, there were no diﬀerences
in mean Visit Count between the forehead versus chin areas for the ‘‘cropped’’ and the
‘‘mouth’’ ROIs. For the ‘‘border’’ and the ‘‘eyes’’ ROIs’, mean Visit Count was greater for
the forehead- than for the chin-cropped faces in the short-term condition (p’s< .001), but not
in the long-term condition. Visit Duration for the ‘‘noncropped’’ ROIs’ was greater for the
chin- than for the forehead-cropped faces in both, the short-term (p< .001) and the long-term
Figure 6. Faces Task Encoding data: Visit Duration and Visit Count for the different ROIs.
ROIs¼Regions of Interest.
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(p¼ .002), conditions. Figure 6 demonstrates the results of comparisons between mean Visit
Count for diﬀerent ROIs in forehead- and chin-cropped faces, separately for the two
conditions.
Recognition analysis. Consistent with the behavioral data analysis, a mixed 2 2 2 ANOVA
was conducted to assess the impact Error Type and Cropping Location on participants’
oculomotor variables across the two memory Conditions. The data were analyzed
separately for Visit Duration and Visit Count. The adjustment for multiple comparisons
was done with Bonferroni correction. The eye-tracking data were examined using the same
ROIs as the behavioral Recognition analysis (Figure 2). The eye-tracking heatmap
visualizations are presented in Figure 7.
The analysis of Visit Duration revealed a substantial main eﬀect for Error Type,
F(1, 81)¼ 104.030, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .562, demonstrating that the participants had
higher mean Visit Duration for extension (M¼ 34.252, SE¼ 1.352) than for restriction
(M¼ 25.161, SE¼ 1.026) answer options. There was a substantial main eﬀect for cropping
Location, F(1, 81)¼ 70.645, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .466, showing that the participants had
higher mean Visit Duration for the forehead-cropped (M¼ 32.265, SE¼ 1.259) than for
the chin-cropped (M¼ 27.149, SE¼ 1.040) images. There was a signiﬁcant Error
TypeLocation interaction, F(1, 81)¼ 31.698, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .281. The diﬀerence
between the mean Visit Duration for BE and BR answer options for the forehead-cropped
images (MDBE-BR¼ 13.639, SE¼ 1.209, p< .001; MBE¼ 39.085, SE¼ 1.654; MBR¼ 25.446,
SE¼ 1. 080) was greater than for the chin-cropped images (MDBE-BR¼ 4.543, SE¼ 1.197,
p< .001; MBE¼ 29.420, SE¼ 1.219; MBR¼ 24.877, SE¼ 1.181). The eﬀect of Condition was
not signiﬁcant, F(1, 81)¼ 2.791, p¼ .099, partial Z2¼ .033. There was no Error
TypeCondition interaction, F(1, 81)¼ .146, p¼ .703, partial Z2¼ .002. There was no
LocationCondition interaction, F(1, 81)¼ .677, p¼ .413, partial Z2¼ .008. There was a
signiﬁcant Error TypeLocationCondition interaction between, F(1, 81)¼ 26.185,
p< .001, partial Z2¼ .244, indicating that the Error TypeLocation interaction varied
between the long-term and the short-term conditions. A separate analysis for the two
conditions revealed that forehead versus chin asymmetry of BE eﬀect (Error
TypeLocation interaction) was present in the short-term condition, F(1, 40)¼ 37.554,
p< .001, partial Z2¼ .484, but not in the long-term condition, F(1, 41)¼ .270, p¼ .606,
partial Z2¼ .007. Figure 8 presents recognition results for the diﬀerent Error Types,
Conditions and cropping Locations, based on eye-tracking data.
The analysis of Visit Count revealed a substantial main eﬀect for Error Type,
F(1, 81)¼ 131.129, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .618, showing that the participants had higher
mean Visit Count for the extension (M¼ 60.603, SE¼ 1.789) than for the restriction
(M¼ 46.165, SE¼ 1.501) answer options. There was a substantial main eﬀect for cropping
Location, F(1, 81)¼ 85.516, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .514, showing that the participants had
higher mean Visit Count for the forehead-cropped (M¼ 57.355, SE¼ 1.671) than for the
chin-cropped (M¼ 49.413, SE¼ 1.506) answer options. There was a signiﬁcant Error
TypeLocation interaction, F(1, 81)¼ 39.501, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .328. The diﬀerence
between the mean Visit Count for BE and BR answer options for the forehead-cropped
images (MDBE-BR¼ 20.974, SE¼ 1.624, p< .001; MBE¼ 67.842, SE¼ 2.144; MBR¼ 46.868,
SE¼ 1.518) was greater than for the chin-cropped images (MDBE-BR¼ 7.903, SE¼ 1.645,
p< .001; MBE¼ 53.364, SE¼ 1.723; MBR¼ 45.461, SE¼ 1.709). The eﬀect of Condition
was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 81)¼ .006, p¼ .937, partial Z2¼ .000. There was a signiﬁcant but
weak Error TypeCondition interaction, F(1, 81)¼ 8.249, p¼ .005, partial Z2¼ .092. The
Error Type eﬀect was less pronounced in the short-term (MDBE-BR¼ 10.817, SE¼ 1.794,
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p< .001;MBE¼ 58.671, SE¼ 2.588;MBR¼ 47.854, SE¼ 2.135) than in the long-term condition
(MDBE-BR¼ 18.060, SE¼ 1.772, p< .001; MBE¼ 62.536, SE¼ 2.527; MBR¼ 44.476,
SE¼ 2.110). There was no interaction between Location and Condition, F(1, 81)¼ 2.085,
p¼ .153, partial Z2¼ .025. There was a signiﬁcant Error TypeLocationCondition
interaction, F(1, 81)¼ 38.500, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .322. A separate analysis for the two
conditions revealed that the forehead versus chin asymmetry of BE eﬀect (Error
TypeLocation interaction) was present in the short-term condition, F(1, 40)¼ 54.347,
p< .001, partial Z2¼ .576, but not in the long-term condition, F(1, 41)¼ .005, p¼ .941, partial
Figure 8. Recognition data: Visit Duration and Visit Count for the different types of errors in the Faces Task.
ROI¼Region of Interest; BE¼Boundary Extension; BR¼ Boundary Restriction.
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Z2¼ .000. Figure 8 presents the recognition results for the diﬀerent Error Types, Conditions and
cropping Locations, based on the eye-tracking data.
The effect of Emotion. Consistent with the behavioral data analysis, a mixed 6 2 2 ANOVA
was conducted to assess the impact of Emotion and Error Type on the eye-tracking measures,
across the two memory Conditions. The data were analyzed separately for Visit Duration and
Visit Count. The adjustment for the multiple comparisons was done with Bonferroni
correction.
The analysis of Visit Duration revealed a substantial main eﬀect of Error Type,
F(1, 81)¼ 98.561, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .549, demonstrating that the participants ﬁxated at
the BE answer options longer than at the BR answer options. It was a signiﬁcant, though
weak, eﬀect of Emotion, F(5, 405)¼ 10.861, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .118. Pairwise comparisons
demonstrated that the faces representing ‘‘Angry’’ emotion evoked longer Visit Duration
than all the other emotions (all p’s< .001, but for the ‘‘Sad’’ emotion p¼ .054). There was
a signiﬁcant but weak interaction between Emotion and Error Type, F(5, 405)¼ 4.216,
p< .001, partial Z2¼ .049, suggesting that the Error Type eﬀect diﬀered depending on the
Emotion. Pairwise comparisons of the Emotion and Error Type interaction revealed that
Mean Diﬀerence (BE-BR) was signiﬁcant for all emotions: ‘‘Angry’’ (MDBE-BR¼ 3.771,
SE¼ 0.470, p< .001); ‘‘Disgust’’ (MDBE-BR¼ 1.612, SE¼ 0.477, p¼ .001); ‘‘Happy’’
(MDBE-BR¼ 3.817, SE¼ 0.427, p< .001); ‘‘Neutral’’ (MDBE-BR¼ 3.524, SE¼ 0.564,
p< .001); ‘‘Sad’’ (MDBE-BR¼ 2.113, SE¼ 0.451, p< .001); and ‘‘Surprise’’ (MDBE-
BR¼ 2.869, SE¼ 0.622, p< .001) emotions. Furthermore, to compare the size of BE eﬀect
for diﬀerent types of emotions, the additional repeated measures analysis with BE-BR as a
dependent measure and Emotion as a within-subjects variable. Pairwise comparisons
demonstrated that mean BE-BR for the ‘‘Angry’’ emotion was signiﬁcantly greater
compared with the ‘‘Disgust’’ (MD¼ 2.147, SE¼ 0.626, p¼ .014). BE-BR for the ‘‘Happy’’
emotion was also greater compared with the ‘‘Disgust’’ (MD¼ 2.204, SE¼ 0.601, p¼ .007)
and ‘‘Sad’’ (MD¼ 1.700, SE¼ 0.554, p¼ .044) emotions. No other signiﬁcant diﬀerences
were revealed. The eﬀect of Condition was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 81)¼ 2.428, p¼ .123,
partial Z2¼ .029. There was no interaction between Type and Condition, F(1, 81)¼ .013,
p¼ .909, partial Z2< .001. There was a weak but signiﬁcant interaction between Emotion and
Condition, F(5, 81)¼ 2.780, p¼ .017, partial Z2¼ .033, suggesting that the Emotion eﬀect
diﬀered depending on the Condition. Figure 8 presents mean Visit Duration of BE and BR
answers for the diﬀerent types of Emotions in both Conditions. In addition, for a clearer
demonstration of Error Type eﬀect for each emotion, this ﬁgure displays the diﬀerence
between BE and BR measures (BE-BR). The interaction between Emotion, Error Type,
and Condition, F(5, 81)¼ 26.185, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .244 was not signiﬁcant.
Similarly, the analysis of Visit Count revealed a substantial main eﬀect for Error Type,
F(1, 81)¼ 121.330, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .600, demonstrating that the participants ﬁxated at
the BE answer options more often than at the BR answer options. There was a signiﬁcant
eﬀect for Emotion, F(5, 405)¼ 27.227, p< .001, partial Z2¼ .252. Pairwise comparisons
demonstrated that the faces representing ‘‘Angry’’ emotion evoked longer Visit Count than
all the other emotions (all MDBE-BR> 3.705, SE< 0.689, p’s< .001). Visit Count for faces
with the ‘‘Surprise’’ emotion was lower than the ‘‘Neutral’’ (MDBE-BR¼ 1.684, SE¼ 0.527,
p¼ .030) and ‘‘Sad’’ (MDBE-BR¼2.412, SE¼ 0.592, p¼ .002) emotions. There was a
signiﬁcant but weak interaction between Emotion and Error Type, F(5, 405)¼ 4.827,
p< .001, partial Z2¼ .056. The eﬀect of Condition was not signiﬁcant, F(1, 81)¼ .058,
p¼ .811, partial Z2¼ .001. There was a weak but signiﬁcant interaction between Type and
Condition, F(1, 81)¼ 6.102, p¼ .016, partial Z2¼ .070. There was a weak but signiﬁcant
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interaction between Emotion and Condition, F(5, 405)¼ 74.313, p¼ .024, partial Z2¼ .031.
Pairwise comparisons of the Emotion and Error Type interaction revealed that Mean
Diﬀerence (BE-BR) was signiﬁcant for all emotions: ‘‘Angry’’ (MDBE-BR¼ 6.274,
SE¼ 0.732, p< .001); ‘‘Disgust’’ (MDBE-BR¼ 3.183, SE¼ 0.709, p< .001); ‘‘Happy’’ (MDBE-
BR¼ 6.028, SE¼ 0.560, p< .001); ‘‘Neutral’’ (MDBE-BR¼ 4.934, SE¼ 0.751, p< .001); ‘‘Sad’’
(MDBE-BR¼ 3.472, SE¼ 0.582, p< .001); and ‘‘Surprise’’ (MDBE-BR¼ 3.997, SE¼ 0.769,
p< .001) emotions. Furthermore, to compare the size of BE eﬀect for diﬀerent types of
emotions, the additional repeated measures analysis with BE-BR as a dependent measure
and Emotion as a within-subjects variable. Pairwise comparisons demonstrated that BE-BR
for the ‘‘Angry’’ emotion was signiﬁcantly greater compared with the ‘‘Disgust’’ (MD¼ 3.084,
SE¼ 0.927, p¼ .020) and the ‘‘Sad’’ (MD¼ 2.783, SE¼ 0.880, p¼ .033) emotions. BE-BR for
the ‘‘Happy’’ emotion was also greater compared with the ‘‘Disgust’’ (MD¼ 2.843,
SE¼ 0.832, p¼ .015) and the ‘‘Sad’’ (MD¼ 2.542, SE¼ 0.764, p¼ .020) emotions. The
interaction between Emotion, Error Type, and Condition, F(5, 405)¼ .908, p¼ .476, partial
Z2¼ .011, was not signiﬁcant.
Discussion
The analyses of behavioral (Error Frequency) and eye-tracking (Visit Duration and Visit
Counts) Recognition data yielded highly consistent results. The main eﬀect of Error Type
was found: The BE answer options were selected signiﬁcantly more frequently and attracted
more attention than the BR answer options. Thus, Study 1 demonstrated the evidence of BE
eﬀect in face processing. The analysis revealed no interaction between Error Type and
Condition for Error Frequency and Visit Duration measures; however, there was a weak
but signiﬁcant interaction for Visit Count measure. These results provide the robust evidence
of the BE eﬀect for the diﬀerent retention intervals, though, Visit Count results indicate that
this eﬀect may be somewhat more conspicuous in the long-term condition. Furthermore, the
BE eﬀect was more pronounced for the forehead-cropped images. This demonstrates the
evidence of the asymmetry of BE eﬀect in face images. However, the forehead-biased
asymmetry of BE eﬀect manifested only in the short-term Condition. Markedly, during the
Encoding, the forehead-biased asymmetry in Face Area eﬀect was also found in the short-
term, but not in the long-term Condition.
The additional analyses revealed the eﬀect of Emotion on Visit Duration and Count: The
‘‘angry’’ emotion evoked more attention than all the other emotions. Furthermore, the found
interaction between Emotion and Error type suggests that the strength of BE eﬀect may diﬀer
depending on the type of Emotion. The analysis of the eye-tracking measures revealed that
the BE eﬀect was greater for the ‘‘Angry’’ and the ‘‘Happy’’ emotions and smaller for the
‘‘Disgust’’ and the ‘‘Sad’’ emotions. Similarly, but not fully consistent, the analysis of mouse
clicks revealed that the BE eﬀect was greater for the ‘‘Happy’’ emotion but smaller for the
‘‘Disgust’’ and the ‘‘Neutral’’ emotions.
Study 2
After Study 1 has established BE in processing of cropped face images, Study 2 aimed to
examine the relationship between the strength of BE and individual diﬀerences in
imagery and emotion. Thus, the same participants as in the Study 1 were asked to
perform additional tests on individual diﬀerences in object and spatial imagery and
emotional processing.
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Method
Participants. Thirty-nine participants from the short-term memory condition and 38
participants from the long-term memory condition completed the full set of assessments.
Materials and procedure. The participants received four diﬀerent questionnaires and tasks:
OSIQ, Emotion Vividness task, Geneva Emotion Recognition Test (GERT), and Range
and Diﬀerentiation of Emotional Experience Scale (RDEES). In addition, Emotion
Recognition performance data from Faces Task (Study 1) were analyzed.
OSIQ. This is a self-report measure assessing individual diﬀerences in visual-object and
visual-spatial imagery (Blajenkova et al., 2006). The OSIQ consists of 15 statements assessing
object mental visualization and 15 statements assessing spatial mental visualization.
Participants had to rate these items on a 5-point scale from total agreement to total
disagreement. The scores for object and spatial imagery are calculated by averaging the
corresponding 15 ratings per subscale. The internal reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) of the
object and spatial imagery subscales are .83 and .79, respectively (Blajenkova et al., 2006).
Emotion Vividness task. In this task, participants had to imagine six basic emotions (anger,
surprise, happiness, disgust, sadness, fear; see Ekman, 1992) as well as neutral facial
expression inside the empty face outline, presented for 5 s on a computer screen. After
imagining each emotion, participants rated the vividness of their subjective mental image
using the 5-point scale adopted from the VVIQ (Marks, 1973): 5 perfectly clear and as vivid
as normal vision), 4 (clear and reasonably vivid), 3 (moderately clear and vivid), 2 (vague and
dim), 1 (no image at all, you only ‘‘know’’ that you are thinking of the object). This task was
developed by the author of this study, and it is not a validated task of imagined emotion
vividness.
GERT. This test is assessing the ability to accurately recognize emotional states (Schlegel,
Grandjean, & Scherer, 2014). Participants watched 83 short video clips with sound, in which
5 male and 5 female actors expressed diﬀerent emotions conveyed both by facial expressions
and voice (using pseudolinguistic sentences). Participants had to select the emotion word
(from 14 emotions), which best describes the emotion expresses in the video.
RDEES. This is self-report assessing individual diﬀerences in emotional complexity, which
is deﬁned as having emotional experiences that are broad in range and well-diﬀerentiated
(Kang & Shaver, 2004). Seven items tap Range (e.g., ‘‘I have experienced a wide range of
emotions throughout my life’’), and seven Diﬀerentiation of Emotional Experiences (e.g.,
‘‘I am aware of the subtle diﬀerences in the feelings that I have’’). Participants rated each item
on a 5-point scale (1¼ does not describe me very well and 5¼ describes me very well). The
scores for Range (RDEES-r) and Diﬀerentiation (RDEES-d) subscales were computed by
averaging the corresponding ratings. The internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of this
questionnaire is .85 (.82 for the RDEES-r subscale and .79 for RDEES-d subscale; Kang
& Shaver, 2004).
Emotion Recognition. Based on the responses given in a Faces Task (Study 1), the accuracy
of emotional recognition was computed as a number of correctly identiﬁed emotions. Note,
this is not a validated task of emotional recognition, and also it was done simultaneously with
memorization. The reliability was quite low (Cronbach’s alpha¼ .210). Thus, another
variable, Emotion Recognition accuracy was computed by excluding the most inconsistent
4 items with accuracy below 50% (Cronbach’s alpha was still quite low¼ .259).
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Results
The relationships between diﬀerent memory errors, imagery, and emotional measures
were analyzed using Pearson’s Correlational Analysis. In the short-term memory condition
(Table 1), the analysis revealed no relationship between the frequency of BE/BR errors and
any of imagery measures. Emotion Recognition accuracy in the Faces Task tended to be
positively correlated with BE and negatively with BR errors (p’s¼ .091). Furthermore, longer
Visit Duration and Count (both for BE/BR images) were positively associated with higher
scores on GERT (all p’s .015). Visit Count was negatively associated with Vividness of
Emotional Imagery (p¼ .054 for Extension and p¼ .015 for Restriction Visit Count).
In the long-term memory condition (Table 2), the analysis revealed signiﬁcant positive
relationship between the frequency of BE errors and object imagery (p¼ .038). Inversely,
the relationship between the frequency of BR errors and object imagery was negative
(p¼ .020). In addition, attention to BR images was signiﬁcantly and negatively associated
with object imagery (p¼ .039 for Visit Duration and p¼ .014 for Visit Count). Furthermore,
RDEES-d was positively associated with frequency of BE Errors (p¼ .042), and negatively
with frequency of BR Errors (p¼ .036), as well as restriction Visit Count (p¼ .025). The
similar, but nonsigniﬁcant, trends were observed between the BE Errors and Emotion
Vividness as well as GERT. Emotion Recognition accuracy in the Faces Task tended to be
negatively associated with visual attention, both for BE/BR images (p’s .033 for Emotion
Recognition and Visit Count, p¼ .032 for Visit Duration).
In addition, the relationship between imagery and emotional measures was examined
using the combined data from the long-term and short-term conditions (N¼ 79). Object
imagery scale of the OSIQ was positively correlated with Emotion Vividness (r¼ .289,
p¼ .010), RDEES-r (r¼ .439, p< .001), RDEES-d (r¼ .508, p< .001), as well as with
Emotion Recognition accuracy in the Faces Task (r¼ .223, p¼ .049)/Emotion
Recognition (r¼ .193, p¼ .091). GERT was positively correlated with RDEES-r (r¼ .268,
p¼ .018), but negatively and marginally signiﬁcantly with spatial imagery scale of the OSIQ
(r¼.215, p¼ .058). Emotion Vividness tended to correlate with RDEES-r (r¼ .216,
p¼ .058) and RDEES-d (r¼ .220, p¼ .053), and the latter two were also interrelated
(r¼ .589, p< .001).
Discussion
Study 2 demonstrated positive relationship between BE measures and individual diﬀerences
in object but not spatial imagery. This indicates that individuals with higher object imagery
showed greater BE and lesser BR eﬀect. Similarly, individuals who reported higher emotional
diﬀerentiation tended to have more pronounced BE errors. However, the relation between
BE and imagery or emotional measures was observed primarily in the long-term condition.
Consistent with the previous research (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2010), object, but not
spatial imagery, tended to be positively associated with diﬀerent emotional measures, which
tended to be interrelated. Overall, object imagery and emotional measures’ relationships with
BE measures were similar.
General Discussion
The present work examined BE phenomenon in face processing. The results of the Study 1
demonstrated signiﬁcantly more BE than restriction recognition errors, as revealed by both
performance and eye-tracking measures. Thus, consistent with previous literature (Hubbard
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et al., 2010; Intraub & Bodamer, 1993), the present ﬁndings suggest that people are prompted
to perceptual and memory errors, in which they see or remember seeing parts of images that
were not visible during the presentation but were possible to be inferred from the visible
information. The present study demonstrated BE eﬀect in both short-term and long-
term memory conditions. This is consistent with other research that found BE for a wide
range of retention intervals (Intraub & Dickinson, 2008; Intraub & Richardson, 1989; Safer
et al., 1998).
The present results indicate that BE eﬀect could be somewhat more pronounced in the long-
term condition. The found diﬀerence in BE eﬀect between the two memory conditions was
rather small and appeared only in Visit Count analysis. From the multisource model
perspective (Intraub, 2012), this ﬁnding may suggest that the increased retention time
could lead to a greater diﬃculty in distinguishing between amodally generated and
remembered visual sensory information, thus resulting in a greater BE in the long-term
condition. In addition, the diﬀerence between the two memory conditions may be
explained by the diﬀerence in the awareness about the nature of the memory task. In the
short-term condition, after the very ﬁrst trial, participants became aware of the subsequent
memory test that required boundary knowledge, whereas in the long-term condition,
participants became aware about the memory test only after the ﬁrst block of trials.
Moreover, due to a signiﬁcant delay between the Encoding and Recognition in the long-
term condition, the awareness about memorization demand during the Encoding could
decrease. It is important to note that during the Encoding, participants had to
simultaneously identify the emotion and to memorize the face, which could be considered
as a dual task (Pashler, 1994). Emotional identiﬁcation was a primary task, and Recognition
came afterward. Eye-tracking data indicated that the participants, ﬁrst, focused on the
emotional identiﬁcation. The majority of the ﬁrst ﬁxations were in the ‘‘eyes’’ area,
whereas other facial parts were examined later. Because the diﬀerences between the
Recognition answer options appeared solely in the place of a crop, the ‘‘border’’ area
provided important cues for face memorization, critical for the subsequent Recognition.
As it can be seen from the eye-tracking visualizations, with more trials, participants
increased their attention toward the ‘‘border’’ areas, most probably because they were
realizing the importance of this area for the Recognition performance. Indeed, several
participants spontaneously mentioned that they were focused on border areas in demand
to the expected subsequent Recognition task. Similarly, Gagnier et al. (2013) suggested that
the cropped region is a salient marker of boundary placement and found multiple ﬁxations to
this area. In the long-term condition, the Recognition was delayed, so, possibly, the
participants were more focused on emotional identiﬁcation and less focused on the
memorization for further Recognition task. Indeed, in the short-term condition, the
attention to the ‘‘border’’ and its neighboring ‘‘cropped’’ areas was greater than in the
long-term condition, while the attention to the ‘‘eyes’’ and ‘‘mouth’’ areas was greater in
the long-term condition. These results are similar to Gagnier et al. (2013) ﬁnding that the
participants who were told that the boundary memory was tested had higher oculomotor
activity near the boundaries of pictures than the participants who were not informed about
the nature of the test. Thus, consistent with previous research that showed the reduction of
BE error when participants were informed about the nature of the task (Gagnier et al., 2013;
Intraub & Bodamer, 1993), the short-term memory condition in the present research yielded
somewhat reduced BE error.
The present research demonstrated BE for isolated face images on blank backgrounds. This
is unlike the majority of the studies, which found BE primarily for images containing scenes
with background texture but not in response to isolated objects removed from the
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background context (Chadwick et al., 2013; Gottesman & Intraub, 2002, 2003; Intraub et al.,
1998; Mullally et al., 2012). It should be noted that stimuli used in the present work contained
cropped faces, which are likely to elicit the sense of continuation beyond the picture
boundaries. Thus, the perception of close-up cropped faces yields BE, as the perception of
scenes does. Probably, cropped faces, similar to truncated scenes, elicit BE, which may be not
true for other types of nonface objects. Further research is needed to examine whether this
eﬀect could be found for diﬀerent nonface objects. The present ﬁndings advocate some
common mechanisms in face and scene perception. As suggested by previous literature, the
perception of faces involves conﬁgural processing, for example, a perception of the relations
between the separate features rather than their processing in piecemeal or analytical way
(Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & Sengco, 1997). Conﬁgural processing of faces implies
holistic processing (building a gestalt from separate individual features), as well as relational
arrangement of features (two eyes above the nose and a mouth below) and distances between
these features (Maurer, Grand, & Mondloch, 2002). Similarly, scene perception involves
conﬁgural and relational processing (Chun, 2003). Furthermore, Gallagher et al. (2005)
found that the salience of the scene background increases the magnitude of BE. Indeed, a
large body of evidence advocates that faces are extremely salient visual stimuli (Farah et al.,
1998). Besides, it may be the case that face images elicited BE in the current study because the
stimuli represented close-up views. As indicated by previous research (Intraub et al., 1992),
the degree of BE grows as increasingly close-up views are presented.
Furthermore, the present ﬁndings provide a new evidence on asymmetry of BE. Consistent
with predictions, the results of the Study 1 demonstrated signiﬁcantly more pronounced BE
errors for forehead- than for chin-cropped face area. The Recognition analysis showed that,
overall, the measures of BE in the forehead-cropped faces exceeded the measures of BE in the
chin-cropped faces. In support of the attentional explanation of the asymmetry in BE,
the present work found the asymmetry in attention in processing diﬀerent facial parts. The
present ﬁndings are consistent with the literature on face processing, showing that greater
attention is paid to the upper part of the face, and in particular, to eyes area (Janik et al.,
1978; McKelvie, 1976; Mertens et al., 1993; Pellicano et al., 2006; Walker-Smith et al., 1977;
Yarbus, 1967). The eye-tracking analysis of the Encoding demonstrated that, in both memory
conditions, for both forehead- and chin-cropped faces, most attention was paid to the ‘‘eyes’’
and then ‘‘mouth’’ regions. Possibly, the presence of eyes may cue the attention to the
neighboring ‘‘border’’ areas. The attentional cueing by the ‘‘eyes’’ may elicit BE in the
upper part of the face and suppress it on the uncued side (see also Intraub et al., 2006).
The present ﬁndings that BE was greater for the upper than the lower part the face may be
explained by the increased attention to the ‘‘eyes’’ area. Surprisingly, while the ‘‘eyes’’ was the
most salient area in both conditions, the asymmetry of BE eﬀect was evident only in the
short-term, but not in the long-term condition. It is possible that with a more delayed
recognition testing, the memory representation may include less visual information and
more information suggested by the mental schema. The enhanced visual attention in the
upper part of a face may trigger the forehead-biased asymmetry of BE. However, visual
detail may be not remembered after a signiﬁcant delay, thus the asymmetry of BE could be
observed only in the short-term, but not in the long-term condition. Also, the intriguing
diﬀerence in asymmetry of BE between the two memory conditions could be related to the
diﬀerence in attentional distribution during the Encoding. The analysis of oculomotor
behavior during the Encoding demonstrated that in the short-term condition, the ‘‘eyes’’
areas in the forehead-cropped faces attracted more attention than in the chin-cropped faces.
Even when excluding ‘‘eyes,’’ the upper ‘‘border’’ areas attracted more attention than the lower
‘‘border’’ face areas. Besides, ‘‘noncropped’’ upper face areas attracted more attention than
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‘‘noncropped’’ lower face areas. Markedly, this increased attention to the upper face parts in
the forehead-cropped compared with chin-cropped faces was found only in the short-term
condition. This indicates that the diﬀerences in processing forehead- and chin-cropped faces
between the twomemory conditions already appeared during the Encoding. Overall, the earlier
comparisons between the two memory conditions suggest that the speciﬁc patterns of BE
errors, that is, forehead-biased asymmetry, revealed in memory (during the Recognition)
were consistent with the speciﬁc patterns of attention revealed during the perception
(Encoding).
Besides the attentional asymmetry in face processing, there are other possible explanations
why such an asymmetry in BE in face processing may exist. One possibility could be that in
our everyday life, we are more used to see forehead- than chin-cropped faces (e.g., people
wearing hats); due to this experience, we may be better in mental continuation of the upper
parts rather than lower parts of faces. This possibility could be explored by examining BE in
face images of human-like animals (e.g., monkeys), who do not typically cover their heads.
Furthermore, because previous research found that asymmetry in scene representation may
be caused by the anticipatory processing in a certain direction, and in particular, anticipated
motion (Courtney & Hubbard, 2004), it is possible that ‘‘eyes’’ may convey some sort of
motion information, causing BE. There is evidence that gaze direction may indicate
anticipated action and intention (Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 2003). Additional
research is needed to explore the possibility whether gaze direction (e.g., looking to the left
or to the right side, looking up or down, closed or opened eyes) may inﬂuence the asymmetry
of BE. Alternatively, a greater BE of the upper face part could be because the upper face area
is greater in size than the lower one. Experiments, using artiﬁcially modiﬁed faces with
equalized forehead and chin area, can address this possibility. Another possibility, which
also can be tested by using artiﬁcially modiﬁed face stimuli, is that the asymmetry of BE in
faces may be caused by the perceptual diﬀerences between the top of the head, which does not
continue, and the chin area, which extends to the neck and below body parts. Further
research is necessary to determine which explanation is best supported. Notably, because
both conditions used the same face stimuli, the found diﬀerence in the asymmetry of BE
between the two conditions indicates that this asymmetry could not fully be due to a bias
caused by the characteristics of the stimuli. Irrespective of why such an asymmetry may
occur, the present ﬁnding of asymmetry of BE in face images expands the existing
evidence that the content of an image may inﬂuence BE. Furthermore, it contributes to
understanding the roles of perception and memory in BE phenomenon.
The results of Study 2 showed that individual diﬀerences in imagery relate to BE. In
particular, object, but not spatial, imagery was associated with BE. These ﬁndings support
our hypothesis that, depending on the content of the image (scene vs. isolated object or face),
BE may relate not only to the strength of spatial imagery, as in Munger and Multhaup (2016)
study, which used scenes, but also to the strength of object imagery, as in the present study,
which used faces. Besides, the present results demonstrated that object imagery was positively
associated with vividness of imagined emotional expressions, which requires visualizing
pictorial perceptual details inside the empty face contour.
Emotion vividness, similar to object imagery, tended to be positively associated with
extension and negatively with restriction errors. The present results extend the research of
Mullally et al. (2012), who found that individual diﬀerences in spatial scene imagery vividness
was associated with BE for scenes, whereas the present ﬁndings show the association between
object imagery and BE for faces. In addition to measures of individual diﬀerences in imagery,
the current research included measures of emotional processing. Consistent with expectations
and previous research (Blazhenkova & Kozhevnikov, 2010), emotional measures were
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positively related with object but not with spatial imagery. Similar to object imagery, the
emotional measures tended to have positive relationship with BE errors. Intriguingly, the
relationships between the BE measures and individual diﬀerences in imagery were evident
mostly in the long-term condition. Thus, the individuals with greater imagery abilities tended
to have a greater BE. Probably, because imagery involves a top-down mental constructive
processing (Ganis et al., 2004; Mechelli et al., 2004), these individuals were more likely to
make commission memory errors. The relationship between BE and imagery could manifest
only in the long-term condition because a delayed recognition testing task required less
sensory information and more mental schema suggestions. Previous explanations of BE
mechanisms indicated the involvement of mental imagery or mental visualization of
nonvisible image parts, extending beyond the borders. Foley, Foley, Scheye, and Bonacci
(2007) indicated the resemblance of BE errors to object completion errors, resulting from
mental ﬁlling-in. Perceptual ﬁlling-in involves mental completion of visual image and the
perception of visual features that are physically present only the surroundings (Komatsu,
2006; Walls, 1954). It is phenomenologically experienced as a perception of the completed
textured and colorful objects (Kanizsa, 1979; Ramachandran & Gregory, 1991) and having
a coherent object representation (Shipley & Kellman, 1992; Yantis, 1995). However, previous
research that showed that BE for scenes occurred regardless of whether a boundary cropped
an object or not, ruled out the object completion explanation of BE (Intraub et al., 1992;
Intraub & Bodamer, 1993; Intraub & Richardson, 1989). Besides, Intraub et al. (1998)
indicated that imagination of background outward of central objects (visual-spatial
information) resulted in BE, whereas imagination of the color within the central object
(visual-object information) did not. In contrast to scene images, possibly, in case of face
cropped images, the anticipatory representation of the cropped face part may cause the
expectation of a continuation of the face itself (a central cropped object), rather than a
scene background outward the face, thus it may involve mental completion processes.
Research showed that eye scanpaths during visual imagery may reenact those of
perception and reﬂect visual scene content (Brandt, & Stark, 1997; Laeng, & Teodorescu,
2002; Mast, & Kosslyn, 2002). Thus, it is probable that the eye ﬁxations in the cropped areas
indicate that participants mentally visualized the missing facial part. As can be seen from the
eye-tracking encoding heat maps (Study 1), in the cropped areas, participants were mostly
focused inside the anticipated missing face part rather in the background of a scene outward
the face. As suggested byGottesman and Intraub (2003), image boundaries can be considered a
partial occluder of a larger scene that extends behind it. In case of amodal completion, the
information about the occluded parts of an object is not supported by sensory modalities.
Hubbard et al. (2010) proposed that, although object completion is unlikely to be the cause of
BE, BE might induce amodal continuation/completion of a cropped object, as in case of a
partially occluded object (Hubbard et al., 2010).
Gottesman and Intraub (2002) proposed that amodal continuation of surfaces plays
fundamental role in scene perception, especially for surfaces truncated by boundaries.
They claimed that spatial extrapolation does not require detailed and rich background but
is just the suggestion of a continuity beyond the image boundaries. However, it is possible
that in case of close-up face images, BE may involve some sort of modal completion rather
than (or in addition to) amodal continuation. Nonspatial object imagery, which refers to
visualization of sensory surface properties such as color and texture, may be more involved in
extrapolation of a cropped face image beyond the boundaries. Future eﬀorts to establish the
nature of mental extrapolation in processing of cropped face images could provide insight
about the characteristics of imagery involved in BE. The current study brings a question
whether the scene construction schema activated by a limited view is purely spatial and how it
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depends on the content of the scene. While the existing neuroimaging research indicates that
BE is supported by the scene-selective brain regions but not by those speciﬁc to object
recognition (Park et al., 2007), the present results raise a question whether BE of cropped
face images may be underpinned by brain areas involved in visual-object processing. Further
research is needed to examine the cognitive mechanisms and neural underpinnings of BE
during cropped face processing. The current literature indicates the existence of both visual-
spatial and visual-object aspects in scene representations. A dual-path model of scene
processing, based on the neurological ‘‘what’’ versus ‘‘where’’ distinction (Ungerleider &
Haxby, 1994), dissociate between processing object and spatial information (Chun, 2003).
Similarly, Aguirre and D’Esposito (1997) distinguished between processing of large-scale
environmental scene pictorial appearance (e.g., landmark knowledge) and spatial locations
within a scene (e.g., survey knowledge), subserved by distinct ventral ‘‘what’’ and dorsal
‘‘where’’ neural pathway. Although visual-spatial properties such as position were shown
to be better encoded in scene representations than visual-object surface properties such as
color (Aginsky & Tarr, 2000), object visualization may play a signiﬁcant role in scene
processing and BE, depending on scene content. The present work adds a new dimension
to the research on BE and encourages the future investigation on individual diﬀerences in
object versus spatial imagery and emotion in relation to BE depending on stimuli type.
Furthermore, the exploratory analyses of the eﬀect of diﬀerent emotions on BE revealed
mixed ﬁndings. Faces with ‘‘Angry’’ and ‘‘Happy’’ emotions tended to evoke a greater
boundary extrapolation. These results are inconsistent with previous research that showed
no diﬀerence in BE for images with diﬀerent emotional content (Candel et al., 2003, 2004).
They are only partially consistent with the research that demonstrated BE only for scenes
with positive but not negative emotional content (Me´ne´trier et al., 2013; Safer et al. 1998).
Such a discrepancy in ﬁndings could be due to the nature of the stimuli that may mobilize
diﬀerent cognitive mechanisms. In particular, Candel et al. as well as Safer et al. used neutral
and aversive scenes that evoked highly unpleasant and arousing emotions, whereas the
present study used faces and the task that involved emotional recognition. Me´ne´trier et al.
used dynamic stimuli representing human bodies cropped in the midthigh or knee level,
whereas the present study used static pictures representing cropped faces. The present
ﬁndings suggest that both positive and negative emotions may induce BE. Notably, both
Angry and Happy emotions are categorized as ‘‘aroused,’’ while disgust and sad are ‘‘not
aroused’’ (Russel, 1980). Possibly, the level or arousal may aﬀect the strength of BE.
Contrary to the suggestion that BE may be ‘‘immune to emotional content because it
involves early perceptual processes, rather than relatively late reconstructive memory
processes’’ (Candel et al., 2003, pp. 694–695), short-term and long-term memory
conditions produced similar eﬀects of emotion on BE. However, present results should be
treated with caution due to a small number of stimuli per Emotion. Future studies are needed
to examine the eﬀect of diﬀerent emotions on spatial extrapolation in face stimuli.
One of the limitations of the present study was using only female faces as stimuli. Unlikely,
but possibly, the found results may not be observed for stimuli using faces of males. The
investigation of this possibility requires an additional investigation. For the present data, the
comparison between males and females on BE and BR measures (mean Error Frequencies,
Visit Duration, and Count) did not reveal any signiﬁcant sex diﬀerences. Another limitation
was that presentation of Recognition answer options was not exactly the same for the short-
term (half increased from right to left, half increased from left to right) and the long-term
condition (all increased from right to left). This discrepancy was due to the fact that the long-
term condition was developed ﬁrst. After the consideration of the long-term memory
limitations, the research design was improved in the short-term condition. Despite this
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diﬀerence, the results indicate the evidence of BE for both orders of the Recognition choices.
Furthermore, the present study did not use any deliberate imagery instructions, and during
the encoding, participants were prompted to focus on recognition of facial expressions and
face memorization. As suggested by previous research, spontaneous imagery, in contrast to
deliberately induced imagery, may encourage source memory errors (Foley et al., 2010).
Possibly, such an instruction ampliﬁed the found BE eﬀect. Further research is needed to
examine the eﬀects of imagery instructions on BE, manipulating not only deliberate versus
spontaneous imagery but also object versus spatial imagery instructions.
In sum, the current work presented new evidence on BE in face processing. Furthermore, it
demonstrated that for short retention intervals, BE errors were more pronounced for
forehead, than for chin face areas, which provided a new evidence of asymmetry in BE.
Moreover, individual diﬀerences in emotional ability and object, but not spatial, imagery
were found to be positively associated with BE in face processing. This investigation raises a
number of research questions and highlights future research directions, which could elucidate
the nature of BE phenomenon.
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Notes
1. Eighty-four participants took part in this research. However, one participant was excluded from the
analysis due to a substantial data loss (responses for only 17 out of 24 trials were recorded).
2. A mouse click was not recorded for the Recognition trial #6 in the long-term condition. The missing
data for this trial was recovered based on the eye-tracking data. Due to the high correspondence
between the mouse click decisions and visit duration, the recognition choice response was assumed to
correspond to the longest visit duration.
3. The analysis was not computed for the main effects of Location and Condition, as well as for
Location  Condition interaction because in the given experimental design, the number of stimuli
cropped in the forehead and chin was the same for the both conditions.
4. The analysis was not computed for the main effects of Emotion and Condition, as well as for
Emotion  Condition interaction because in the given experimental design, the number of choices
for each emotion was the same for the both conditions.
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